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THE CONGLOMERATES: A NEIGHBOR'S VIEW
L. E. BIRDZELL*
Chairman Celler opened recent hearings on conglomerates before the
House Subcommittee on Antitrust with the observation (among others) that
General Electric Company is engaged in 14 business categories listed in the
Standard Industrial Classification, IBM in 8 and duPont in 9.1 Whether
these older multi-market companies would be classified as "conglomerates"
by Chairman Celler, by the new free form corporations, or by each other,
at least some acquaintance with the problems of the very large, multi-market
company, as observed from a time before Corwin Edwards added the term
"conglomerate" to the antitrust vocabulary, provides a different, and perhaps
even useful, perspective of the newer firms.
The multi-market firm is not a new phenomenon. Some of the late
medieval and early modern merchant traders had interests in such diverse
fields as shipping, banking, real estate, farming, whaling, fur trade, railroads,
manufacturing, textiles, and mining. The East India Company was an 18th
century multi-line operation, and the zaibatsu are as old as modern Japanese
industry. Diversification has been an accepted practice in American business
for upwards of two centuries, and to some it may seem late in the day to
challenge in principle the invention of the department store or the mail
order house.
The new conglomerates are thus unique less in their morphology than
in their ontogeny. The older multi-product firms can usually identify an
ancestral core business with some relevance to their growth history. The
new firms have been synthesized by a process of merger, tender offer, and the
invention of novel forms of securities - sometimes called "funny money."
The genius of their conception has centered on exploiting to the limit the
interest deduction 2 and the installment sales8 provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code; the pooling of interests chapter in generally accepted ac-
counting principles; the appetite of investors for combining the security of
a creditor with the right to share in success through equity warrants; the
pyramiding of price-earnings ratios; and perhaps also the fact that section 7
of the Clayton Act deals only with transactions which may substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly - not with bumptious
* Counsel, General Electric Company. A.B., University of Chicago, 1939; LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1942. Member, New York and California Bars.
1 Hearings on the Economic and Political Significance of Mergers and Acquisitions by
Conglomerate Corporations Before Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1969) (opening statement of Chairman
Emanuel Celler) [hereinafter cited as Conglomerate Merger Hearings].
2 INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, § 163.
3 Id. § 453(b).
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newcomers willing to build a single corporate roof over wholly unrelated
businesses.4
To many, the work of putting together the new conglomerates does not
emerge as a form of economic activity with a socially useful objective, how-
ever rewarding it may be to some individuals. Even the most conservative
would agree that tax laws and accounting rules which favor one form of
business organization over another stand in need of reexamination. Yet the
fact that a course of business conduct is selfishly motivated falls short of
warranting government intervention. The issue is whether or not the con-
glomerate is socially or economically harmful, rather than whether or not
it is selfish; and on this issue its ontogeny, however dubious, is not of
primary relevance.
It is of some importance to the American economy to continue to pro-
vide a laboratory for the development of new forms of economic organiza-
tion.5 Unless the new conglomerates are forcing early policy decisions by
irreversibly restructuring the economy or creating unacceptable aggregate
concentration, or unless there is no possibility that they may prove to be of
value to the economy, the preferred policy is to let the conglomerate experi-
ment run its course, with present action directed toward responding to
some lessons already learned as to the need for changes in accounting prac-
tices, tax rules, and securities regulation. In this view, the main issues posed
by the new conglomerates are whether we face a present emergency in re-
structuring or aggregate concentration; and whether the conglomerates offer
possibilities worth a further laboratory experiment. Finally, the new con-
glomerates may need to be reexamined in the light of the general criticisms
being directed toward all multi-market companies.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE CONGLOMERATE MOVEMENT
The rapid early development of the conglomerate movement raised a
question as to whether the major American manufacturing companies were
launched on a course leading to ultimate consolidation into one "General
Everything Corporation. ' 6 The high price-earnings ratios placed on the
leading conglomerates by an enthusiastic stock market gave them the ap-
pearance of a wave of the future, with a potential without clear limits.
It was, of course, evident from the beginning that the number of com-
panies for sale at advantageous prices was finite, and that the concept of
4 For an excellent statement of the view that a go-go corporation is one that goes to
the limit of law and morals, see Conglomerates: A Perspective, Address by Arthur H. Dean
at the University of Chicago, October 17, 1969.
5J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY ix (3rd ed. 1950).
"The fundamental source of industrial gain, the profits that the capitalist order
attaches to successful introduction of new goods or new methods of production or new
forms of organization," Id. (emphasis added).
6 Or the Samson and Delilah company of Art Buchwald's invention. See United
States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 553 (1966) (appendix to the concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Douglas).
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a market for business firms implies the operation of a law of supply and
demand. The recent judgment of the securities market on the future of
growth by acquisition is reflected in the shrunken price-earnings ratios of
conglomerate stocks.7 The price of conglomerate shares, as a multiple of
earnings, has thus fallen well behind the price of shares of some of the
older multi-product companies. This loss of market enthusiasm for the new
firms reflected a number of factors:
(a) Some of the conglomerates experienced substantial difficulty in as-
similating their acquisitions.8 These difficulties have been reflected
in reduced earnings growth.
(b) The possibilities of continued growth through acquisitions were
clouded by the initiation of five test suits by the Antitrust Division.9
(c) It became clear that there would be changes in the Internal Rev.
enue Code which would make it more difficult to carry out acquisi-
tions without incurring seriously discouraging taxes.10
(d) The conglomerates have not been notably successful in acquiring
companies numbered among the leaders in their fields. This fact,
however helpful it might be for antitrust purposes, is calculated to
generate reduced confidence in the quality of the conglomerates'
assets.
(e) The widely publicized failure of Northwest Industries to take over
Goodrich was a conspicuous reminder that the tender offer is less
than irresistible.
(f) The Accounting Principles Board has drafted a proposed opinion
7 One typical list is the following:
Company P/E Ratios
Bangor Punta 10.2
City Investing 11.1
IT & T 17.2
Walter Kidde 11.3
LTV 55
Litton 15.0
Signal Companies 10.9
US Industries 9.1
The Conglomerates P/E Ratios for 8 Leading Conglomerates, WALL STREET REpoars,
Oct. 1969, at 56.
8 See, e.g., Ruckeyser, Litton Down to Earth, FORTUNE, April 1968, at 140.
9 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil No. 13,320 (D. Conn., filed
Aug. 1, 1969) (concerning acquisition of Grinnell Corp.); United States v. International
Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil No. 13,319 (D. Conn., filed Aug. 1, 1969) (concerning acquisition
of Hartford Fire Ins. Co.); United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., Civil No. 69-1102 (N.D.
Ill., filed May 21, 1969) (concerning acquisition of B. F. Goodrich Co.); United States v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil No. 69-924 (N.D. Ill., filed Apr. 28, 1969) (concerning
divestiture of entire interest in Canteen Corp.); United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.,
Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa., filed Apr. 14, 1969) (concerning divestiture of entire interest
in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.).
10 See, e.g., Tax Reform Bill of 1969, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 411, 412 (1969).
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which would eliminate pooling of interest accounting.1 ' The effect
would be to force an acquiring company to revalue tangible assets
and, should the value of the securities issued for the acquired
company exceed the value of the tangible assets, to recognize intan-
gible goodwill. The draft opinion has generated a good deal of
controversy, but one may hope that, at minimum, accounting
principles are about to catch up with the "old movie inventory"
ploy, i.e., buying existing assets at a high price in cash and new
securities; booking them at a much lower figure based on the
seller's original cost less depreciation; and calculating future profits
on sale or use of the assets from depreciated book rather than the
price paid by the alleged profit-maker.
(g) Some of the less dramatic methods of the conglomerates for im-
proving performance by accounting devices have been copied by
prospective acquirees.12
Most of the conglomerates are going through a period of testing and
assimilation. They no longer seem to be on the verge of restructuring the
American economy. The features of accounting practice and tax law which
were important to the conglomerate movement have been discounted in
the security markets even before changes in existing laws and regulations
have been completed.
Signs are accumulating that this particular wave of the future has re-
ceded; for example, the FTC Report has tended to downgrade the overall
role of the new conglomerates in the current merger movement. In this
report by the "Jeremiah of Mergers," Dr. W. F. Mueller,13 only 11 of the
25 most active acquiring corporations among the top 200 turn out to have
been "so called new conglomerates."'1 4 Not only have the new conglomerates
been authoritatively deprived of their primacy of position as principal sin-
ners in the new merger movement, but data published since the issuance of
the FTC Report indicate that total merger activity (at least among large
firms) has abated substantially. 15
11 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PuBLIc AccouNTANTs (AICPA), BUSINESS COMBINA-
TIONS AND GOODWILL 13 (Second Draft Aug. 27, 1969) (confidential memo). See also
AICPA, A Critical Study of Accounting for Business Combinations, AccoUNTING RESEARCH
STUrDY (ARS) No. 5 (1963). This unpublished opinion has received considerable crit-
icism from various elements of the financial and accounting communities and its future
is doubtful.
12 BUREAU OF ECONOMIcs, FTC, EcoNoMIc REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS 131 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT].
Is See N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1969, at 70, col. 2, for a biographical sketch of the principal
author of the FTC REPORT.
14 FTC REPORT 262.
1"Major" mergers declined from 1,831 in 1968 to 1,710 in 1969, and mergers among
very large firms, together with acquisitions of leading firms in other industries, seem
virtually to have ceased. See Address by R.W. McLaren prepared for the N.Y. State Bar
Association's Antitrust Section, Feb. 2, 1970, in TRADE REG. REP. No. 451 (Feb. 2, 1970).
The total number of mergers reported by W. T. Grimm and Company increased in
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THE PROBLEM OF AGGREGATE CONCENTRATION
"Concentrate," as a matter of definition, means "to gather into one
body, mass, or force."' 6 In its economic sense, it connotes a gathering of
moderate-size firms into corporate giants, with consequences vividly drawn
for the particular case of lawyers (among others) in a recent address by
Attorney General Mitchell:
This leaves us with the unacceptable probability that the nation's
manufacturing and financial assets will continue to be concentrated in
the hands of fewer and fewer people- the very evil that the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, and the Celler-Kefauver
Amendment were designed to combat.
You may ask why I, as Attorney General, offer a statement of the
Administration's position on mergers here, in Savannah. One might sug-
gest that this speech should be delivered to bankers and corporate man-
agers in New York or Chicago or Los Angeles.
I am speaking here precisely because most of you represent economic
interests -distant from the centers of financial and managerial power -
which may be injured by the current merger trend.
This Administration believes that one of the great benefits of an open
marketplace is the active participation and control by as many of our
citizens as possible in their own economic well-being -not just a small
segment of our population in certain cities.
An urban area should have a substantial influence over its local
economy. Its businesssmen should have an opportunity to be suppliers.
Its lawyers should have the opportunity to act as counsel. Its unions
should have the opportunity of negotiating in their own community, for
their workers. And its consumers should have the opportunity to exercise
local economic options in their choice of competing goods and services.17
Economic concentration is a phrase that evokes the history of the dis-
appearance of the Roman farmer into the great slave-operated estates; the
zaibatsu of Japan; the land distribution problems of Southeast Asia; and
the special rhetoric of Brandeis' Curse of Bigness. Quite plainly, the prospect
of an American corporate yeomanry being gobbled up by the "General
Everything Corporation" arouses instinctive popular objection.
Some measure of the extent to which the "General Everythings" are in
fact taking over the more moderate-size firms in the manufacturing and
mining sectors of the economy can be garnered from Internal Revenue sta-
tistics on the number of tax returns filed by mining and manufacturing
1970 over 1969, with a fourth quarter surge in activity attributed to anticipation of legal
and accounting changes. See Wall Street Journal, Jan. 6, 1970, at 4, col. 1. The Grimm
data, with its fourth quarter 1969 increase in mergers, cast doubt on the more simplistic
conglomerate price-earnings ratio explanations of the recent merger movement. The
decline in large mergers reported by McLaren, taken with the increase in total number
of mergers reported by Grimm, suggest at least a possibility that mergers, as a business
strategy, are now being pursued more by small firms than by large firms.
16 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1961 ed.).
17 Address by John N. Mitchell, Georgia Bar Association, June 6, 1969, in 5 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 50,247 (1969).
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corporations in various size classes during recent years.' 8 In 1958, firms with
assets of under $10 million filed 154,224 returns. By 1964, the number had
risen (not fallen) to 192,207. While 1965 witnessed a decline in the number
of returns filed to 191,714,19 preliminary figures in 1966 indicate that
193,433 returns were filed, representing a net gain of 39,209 for the period
in question. At the same time, reported assets for these firms increased from
$60,407 million in 1958, to $86,974 million in 1966- a gain of some
$26,567 million, or 43 percent. In other words, during the 1958-1966 period,
the population of small manufacturing and mining firms increased by 25
percent while their assets increased by 43 percent.
During this same period the $10-$100 million asset group registered a
net increase of 703 firms,2 0 while their assets increased from $54,687 million
to $74,676 million - a net increase of $19,989 million. Thus, this size class
saw an increase in population of 36 percent, with a corresponding increase
in assets of 37 percent. It is apparent from the growth in numbers and
assets of moderate-size firms that we are not in fact witnessing a gathering
of our corporate yeomanry into General Everything. Attorney General
Mitchell's lawyer audience may lose an occasional moderate-size client to
the merger movement, but the overall supply of new moderate-size clients
is growing in numbers and fee-paying capability.
Despite these figures, there have been widely-publicized claims that
"concentration" in the manufacturing sector of the economy is increasing.
These claims derive from the fact that the number and size of large firms -
say, firms with assets of over $100 million - have grown more rapidly than
the number and size of firms with assets of less than $100 million.21 Much
of this growth is no doubt a by-product of general prosperity, reflecting
growth of smaller firms into larger ones. Some of it is due to inflation. But
in some sense this over-$100 million group evidently accounted for a con-
siderably greater part of the total increment to the national stock of manu-
facturing and mining capital than did the under-$100 million group.
While a concurrent expansion of both groups evidently does not fit the
elementary definition of concentration - a gathering of smaller firms into
larger ones - the more rapid expansion of large firms does make it possible
to say that the over-$100 million group had a higher percentage, or "share,"
of total assets at the end of the period than it had at the beginning.
The most widely used figures of the type just described appear in
18 The data given here was gathered by the National Industrial Conference Board
and published in Bock, The Arithmetic of Acquisitions, CONr. BD. REc., Aug. 1969, at 26.
19 In 1964, the tax laws were changed in such a way as to encourage filing of con-
solidated returns -a factor which gives 1961-1966 tax return figures a downward bias as a
measure of growth in numbers of corporations.
20 See note 18 supra.
21 For 1958, the Internal Revenue data show 303 over-$100 million firms; in 1966,
the number was 510, or a gain in numbers of 207, or 68 percent. During the same period
reported assets increased from $135,804 million to $267,506 million-a net increase of
$151,702 million, or 97 percent.
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Study Paper Number 2 of the Cabinet Committee on Price Stability,22 and
the FTC Report. The impression created by figures such as those used in
the Study Paper is typified by the remarks of George D. Reycraft at a panel
discussion on the merger guidelines held in August 1968:
From 1957 to 1967, corporate manufacturing assets held by the hun-
dred largest firms moved from about 45.8% to 47.7% and the share of the
200 largest rose from 55% to 58.7%. I think we are going to hear a good
deal more about those numbers in the next Session of Congress and from
the Federal Trade Commission. It is an interesting fact that had there
have been no mergers during this period of time, the concentration figures
in industry generally would have declined somewhat and if firms in the
non-manufacturing industries had been included, the degree of concentra-
tion would have declined substantially.
So I suggest that we are going to be looking at Guidelines in the near
future which are going to direct themselves toward conglomerate mergers,
not in terms of competition, as the Antitrust Division Guidelines do, but
in terms of absolute size and in terms of overall industry concentra-
tion .... 23
The Study Paper (and later, the FTC Report) accept a version of the
Reycraft statement and argue that had there been no mergers, "concentra-
tion" figures (i.e., the percentages) would have declined. According to the
argument, between 1960 and 1967 the top 200 firms (per their 1967 ranking)
had acquired assets equal to 4.3 percent of total 1967 assets; and if these
assets are deducted from the assets of the top 200 and added back to the
assets of the "all other" category, the growth rate for "all others" would
approximate the growth rate for the top 200. The statistical result of the
argument depends on returning the acquired assets to "all others" without
returning to the top 200 what the top 200 had paid for the acquired assets.
The argument also assumes that the "all other" group would have experi-
enced the same general prosperity, as measured by capital growth, even if
the lucrative possibilities of the merger market had not existed-a not
altogether plausible assumption.
While anyone with the normal degree of sympathy for the underdog
would be less than completely happy with the apparent fact that large firms
- over $100 million, the top 200, the top 100, or the top 10-have
grown more rapidly than the small manufacturing firm sector, only about
23.4 percent of the national stock of plant and equipment is in the manu-
facturing sector. 24 Overall, services are increasing their share of the GNP
relative to durable and nondurable goods, and whether the economy as a
whole is moving toward greater concentration is very doubtful. In any case,
the statistical record on capital formation counsels a certain caution in
dealing with proposals to block the development of large business units-
at least if one believes that it is in the interest of human beings to get the
22 STAFF OF THE COMM. ON PmcE STABILITY, STUDIES (1969).
23 The Merger Guidelines, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 872, 887 (1969).
24 NAT'L INDUs. CONF. BD., ROAD MAPS OF INDUSTRY, Sept. 15, 1969.
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world's work done with a maximum input of capital and a minimum input
of human effort. There is certainly no statistical indication that the typical
American manufacturing firm of moderate size is in urgent need of artificial
respiration, or that it stands in discernible danger of disappearance within
the foreseeable future.
THE POSSIBLE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF CONGLOMERATES
An assessment of the possible economic contribution of conglomerates
overlaps the case for more conventional multi-market firms; but, to borrow
again from the biologists, the overlap is in morphology, and the differences
of ontogeny have economic significance.
A. Reasons for Diversification and the Conglomerates
The business decision process behind diversification has not yet been
the subject of extensive objective research. The absence of such research is
to be regretted, because there is reason to regard the conventional explana-
tions with considerable skepticism. Nevertheless, a number of hypothetical
reasons have been advanced for the movement toward diversification
(whether by internal growth or by acquisition) among American business
corporations. Perhaps the most common stereotype explanation is that a
company, finding itself with more money than necessary to meet the capital
requirements of its own businesses, invests the surplus in some new busi-
ness.25 There is thought to be a tax reason for investing profits rather than
distributing them to stockholders, since the investment enhances the capital
value of the stock, whereas the dividend distribution would be taxed as
ordinary income to the stockholders. In addition, the interest of manage-
ment in expanding into new fields is explained in terms of the satisfactions
- financial and psychological - associated with increases in the size of
the organization. Less invidiously, diversification is rationalized as a form
of risk spreading - an expression of hope that several different markets
will not go bad all at once.
The portrayal of the typical business corporation as endowed with
more cash than it wishes to use in its existing business or to distribute in
dividends is not particularly credible. In an expanding economy with rising
prices, charges to depreciation are unlikely to suffice to replace existing
plant, let alone finance the expansion necessary to keep up with an existing
growing business. Consequently, substantial retention of earnings is likely
to be necessary to enable a business to do no more than hold its position in
a growing market. A full employment economy implies a rising cost of labor
and spot manpower shortages, thereby intensifying pressure toward new
capital investment in automatic equipment. The general concept of Amer-
25 See, e.g., 1968 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY, 115 CONG.
REC. 5642, 5645 (daily ed. May 27, 1969) [hereinafter cited as NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT];
FTC REPORT 79.
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ican business generating extensive surplus funds for diversification is also
difficult to reconcile with a persistent rise in business borrowings from
banks, particularly in the face of record-breaking interest rates.26
The urge to retain earnings may also be somewhat overstated. The
effect on the value of the company's outstanding shares from increasing its
dividend rate may well be more favorable than the effect of reporting to
stockholders an investment in an unfamiliar business; and the picture of a
management which has been successful in one business experiencing a con-
suming desire to hazard its good record and increase its workload by ex-
cursions into other and less familiar businesses has no a priori plausibility.
There is at least a possibility that necessity plays a much larger part in cor-
porate diversification than most observers suspect. This is particularly true
if the term "necessity" is understood to include the obligation of corporate
management to use the assets of the corporation to the best advantage.
Some examples may illustrate the point.
The development of a new and competitive product frequently con-
fronts manufacturers of older products with a Hobson's choice between con-
tinuing to concentrate on the old product and diversifying into the new
product. As an obvious example, the invention of the aircraft gas turbine
presented manufacturers of piston engines with a choice between going into
the jet business or accepting the loss of a great part of their future prospects.
Less obviously, the development of gas turbines for aircraft presented manu-
facturers of steam turbines with a possible opportunity to apply steam
turbine technology to gas turbines, under a long-term threat that the gas
turbine might ultimately be a substitute for some steam turbines. As a
result, some steam turbine builders found themselves in the aircraft engine
business and some piston engine builders became manufacturers of gas
turbines - in no case, one suspects, as the result of an exercise in complete
freedom of choice.
The development of the computer presented a similar problem to
manufacturers of punch card accounting machines, e.g., IBM and Sperry
Rand. Again, it may be doubted whether either company felt that entry into
the computer business was a decision as to which it had any real choice.
New product technology frequently ignores existing market patterns.
The electronic and chemical industries are extreme -but not unique -
examples of the impossibility of keeping technological competence within
the bounds of any definable historic product markets.
There is another aspect of technology which tends to encourage di-
versification. Frequently, one of the more promising ways to improve an
existing product is to develop a new component or a new material for use
in the product. The manufacturer who improves components and materials
26 See, e.g., NAT'L INDUS. CONF. BD., BUSINESS TRENDS, Nov. 10, 1969, showing an
increase of 10.5 percent in business loans for the week ended October 29, as compared
to the previous years.
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for use in its own products may find that it has an engineering asset which
can be fully exploited only by manufacturing and selling the improvement
as a separate product line.
One has to guess at the odds, but it is better than an even bet that a
business has reached a point of decline if it generates available funds from
depreciation and undistributed earnings faster than they can profitably be
absorbed in the business. Thus, the railroads which have reached the con-
clusion that some portion of their available funds should be invested outside
the railroad industry are in effect expressing understandable doubts as to
the future of the railroad industry. 27
Without attempting an impossible judgment as to whether diversifica-
tion under some measure of economic compulsion is more or less common
than diversification for its own sake, it is still clear that the two kinds of
diversification present different policy questions. There may be economic
objections to a rule of law which would prevent an entrepreneur from put-
ting a number of business entities under one corporate roof after the manner
of the new conglomerates. But the economic objections are not the same as
the objections to legal restrictions which would prevent a company from
entering additional markets in the interest of making the most efficient pos-
sible use of its existing physical, technological, or managerial assets, or
simply redeploying an existing organization from a declining industry to
one with better prospects.
Conversely, to the extent that the older multi-market firms in fact di-
versify more from necessity than from choice, the new conglomerates may
have filled a need to broaden the market for business firms. Clearly, one
factor which contributed to the development of the conglomerate is the
existence of a demand for a market in which going businesses may be sold.
The owner of a business often has good reason to liquidate his investment
in it. The enterprise may not be suitable for conversion to a publicly held
corporation, and in any event the sale of a business to the public through
underwriters, with underwriting commissions and the accompanying cost
of registration, is expensive at best and impossible unless the business is of
substantial size.
The early decisions of the Supreme Court under the Celler-Kefauver
Act28 markedly reduced the most obvious markets for businessmen who wish
to sell out - namely, their competitors, vendors and customers. Statistically,
the number of horizontal and vertical mergers, as a percentage of the whole,
declined markedly, with the balance shifting heavily toward conglomerate
27See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1968, at 1, col. 4 (commenting on plans of
the Penn-Central).
28Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), amending Act of Oct. 15, 1914,
ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (presently codified in 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964)). See, e.g.,
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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acquisitions.29 This is not to say that the conglomerate merger movement is
a by-product of the Celler-Kefauver Act. The Act does not explain the
increase in the number of corporate mergers since 1950. The most that can
be said with any confidence is that if the most recent merger movement had
occurred under pre-1950 antitrust laws, the conglomerates would have
played a smaller role. What they did was, in some uncertain degree, to fill
a gap in the market for firms created by the amendment of section 7.
B. Management and Organization Potential of the Multi-market Firm
Structurally, both the new conglomerates and older multi-market firms
characteristically include an echelon of division managers, each with overall
responsibility for product design, manufacturing and selling in a single
market, or in a few closely related markets. Both kinds of firm also include
a headquarters management group, and it is quite possible that as a problem
in industrial organization, the conglomerate issue resolves into a question
as to the role and usefulness of the headquarters management group. ° This
is not, however, a question that invites any simple answer. As a first ap-
proach, one can draw on current organization theory for some tentative
indications as to the appropriate function of headquarters management in
a multi-market firm, suggested by such terms as management specialization,
organization slack, asset management, management appraisal, and systems
management.
1. Management Specialization
Current organization theory suggests that different levels of manage-
ment should be specialized to the making of different specific types of de-
cisions.81 This concept entails at least partial rejection of the older pyramid
concepts of management in which men at the higher levels of management
were looked upon as the wiser and more mature- or more ingenious -
counterpart of men at the lower and middle strata of management, to be
consulted on generally the same types of decision as might be initiated at
the lower levels of management whenever the dollar significance of the de-
cision warranted higher level consultation.
The conglomerate company may exemplify the development of spe-
cialization in a new level of management superimposed on the acquired
firms and specialized to the investment, capital planning and financial func-
tions. The usual advantages of specialization can be expected. Financial
planning for the enterprise is likely to be done better by experienced in-
dividuals, while recruitment of competent management for the operating
businesses is simplified because the candidate is not required to have the
29 See STUIsa, supra note 22, at 77, fig. 11.
30 For this provocative suggestion, the writer is indebted to Thomas Paine, presently
Administrator of NASA, and formerly with General Electric Company.
31 See, e.g., H. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 9 (3d ed. 1965).
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special skills of a securities analyst. Perhaps most basic, the shareholder
interest in resource allocation is likely to be somewhat better represented by
individuals with little personal commitment to any one of the diversified
businesses in which the firm engages.
2. Organization Slack
The modern concept of organization slack8 2 may also be relevant to
the headquarters role in the new conglomerates. The phrase "organization
slack" is descriptive of the tendency of business (and other) organizations to
expand and undertake comparatively marginal programs in times of pros-
perity. The management psychology behind this phenomenon includes the
desire for pleasant interpersonal relations within the organization, the in-
terest of management in the growth and development of the business, and
a touch of "empire building." There is a certain plausibility in monitoring
programs with an uncertain payoff in the distant future from a perspective
comparatively free of the psychological commitments which create orga-
nizational slack. At least potentially, the conglomerate seems to offer a
mechanism for such monitoring.
3. Asset Management
In assessing the long-term role of conglomerate management, it must
also be recognized that in addition to the normal operating problem of
allocating resources among going businesses, the redeployment of resources
from old to new areas of diversification is a continuing business problem,
not simply an occasional problem of single-line companies. The usual pre-
diction is that the pace of technological change is more likely to increase
than to slow down. An increasing, rather than declining, rate of change in
the social and economic environment in which business firms operate is also
the accepted prophecy. The need for improved management mechanisms for
coping with change is obvious, and these mechanisms will almost have to
include financial control groups with a minimal career commitment to any
specific field of business.
4. Management Appraisal
Another role for the headquarters group is suggested by the classic line
of criticism to the effect that corporate management is comparatively im-
mune from shareholder removal for marginal incompetence. 33 The con-
glomerate headquarters group has obvious advantages over the investment
trust or the securities market in assessing management competence at the
level of division or subsidiary operations. The conglomerate has access to
more information; its appraisal program can be more persistent and con-
82 See, e.g., R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 36-38 (1963).
33 See generally, A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (1933).
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tinuous. And when in doubt as to the competence of the management in
place, the conglomerate can assess the available alternatives and exercise a
power to bring in better managers, rather than resort to selling off the
investment- the usual recourse of dissatisfied investors.
There remains the question of whether the top layer of management
in a conglomerate is itself adequately responsible to shareowners. This is
not, however, a simple counterpart of the older question as to management
of operating companies. The role of top conglomerate or diversified man-
agement is inherently more attuned to the investor viewpoint in dealing
with the operating subsidiaries or divisions, since headquarters manage-
ment in a multi-market company lacks a personal commitment to a single
line of business. It is also easier for the investing public to appraise con-
glomerate management performance, since the management of a conglom-
erate is not in a position to attribute unsatisfactory profits to transient con-
ditions in any one business. Finally, in terms of the national interest in
economic productivity, there may be a little less at stake, in that below
average performance by a conglomerate's top managers does not necessarily
affect the productive efficiency of the constituent enterprises.
5. Systems Management
Historical modes of organizing separate business firms and separate
markets to provide economic services are sometimes capable of improvement.
As a highly simplified example, transportation of cargo on the Great Lakes
has traditionally involved, among others, naval architects who design the
ships; other architects who design cargo handling facilities; shipbuilders
who construct the ships; contractors who build the terminals; separate firms
which operate the ships; still others which run the terminals; and last, but
by no means least, the shippers who supply the cargo. Each of these par-
ticipants has its own profit interests, its own traditions, its own trade secrets,
and its private perspective on its own needs and the needs of related firms.
Litton has undertaken development of a unified system of transportation
on the Great Lakes, consisting essentially in designing and building the
major parts of the transportation system for the direct benefit of the system
as a whole, with minimal stress on the discrete interests of the separate
parts.3 4
This concept of "systems management" embraces whatever possibilities
may exist for answering the question of why it is possible to go to the moon,
but not possible to solve some conspicuous problems much closer to home.
Perhaps the broader applications of systems management are possible only
in an outer space free of entrenched human self-interest. For present pur-
poses, it is enough only to note that no business organization can explore
the possibilities of the systems approach to major economic functions so
34 See Rubel, Systems Management and Industry Behavior, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD
MERGERS 208-18 (J. Weston & S. Pelzman ed. 1969).
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long as the firm is tied, ideologically or by law, to a narrow group of his-
toric markets.
All this is not to suggest that the actual management behavior of either
the new conglomerates or older multi-market firms conforms very closely to
the possibilities. The empirical research is scanty, and the uses of executive
time notoriously mix a large element of response to urgency with more
thoughtfully planned effort. At least one unpublished study of a sample of
new and old multi-market firms produced indications that headquarters
management in the new firms intervened more actively in division op-
erations than was the practice in older multi-market firms. 5 Headquarters
intervention was measured by such indicators as telephone bills and ex-
ecutive time spent in travel to plant locations. The older firms had large
central staffs, built up from "mother division" staffs as new businesses had
been added. The newer firms typically had not added headquarters staff
much beyond the personnel needed for the acquisition program, and in
the absence of staff experts, the new breed of headquarters executive who
wishes to know what is happening in the operating divisions apparently has
to go see for himself. This behavior pattern may help explain why con-
glomerate executives frequently see themselves as bringing better manage-
ment to the acquired firms. That, plus the additional fact that management
methods are undergoing such rapid development, means that there are very
few firms where an aggressive newcomer could not accelerate the manage-
ment innovation process.
The conclusion that does suggest itself is that there is a reasonable basis
in organization theory for continuing to experiment with the multi-market
firm. Subdividing the management function between headquarters and op-
erations executives is a respectable form of specialization, not unlikely to
facilitate gains in decision-making and planning efficiency ranging from the
marginal to realization of the more epic prospects of the systems approach.
CRITICISMS OF THE MULTI-MARKET COMPANY
A. Cross-Subsidization
The principal economic arguments against conglomerates are variants
of the proposition that, since conglomerates have total resources dispropor-
tionate to their needs in any given market, they have the power to use their
total resources to destroy or weaken competitors in any one business by loss
selling or the threat of it, i.e., to "restructure" the markets in which they
operate by "cross-subsidization."3 6
85 The study was conducted by Mr. Robert Wright, Director of Corporate Planning,
The Mead Corporation, and was the subject of a seminar held in New York, July 5, 1969.
36 FTC REPORT 348-403; Conglomerate Merger Hearings at 20 (remarks of Dr. Willard
F. Mueller). Cf. REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COM-
MISSION 113 n.40 (1969) (statement of Professor Richard A. Posner):
See items cited in section V.A. of the majority report. The lawyer's penchant
for substituting anecdotal for scientific evidence has been a frequent source of
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The notion that business corporations with deep treasuries are likely
to use their funds to discipline a particular market or drive out smaller
competitors in the hope of thereafter exacting monopoly or oligopoly prices
is a warmly cherished feature of the American antitrust tradition. The
potency of the argument may be judged from the fact that it has had the
unlikely effect of making the National Farmers' Union a dedicated sup-
porter of the Robinson-Patman Act.8 7 Yet in its simpler form, the theory
does not explain why even a small competitor in almost any market should
not go into partnership with anyone of numerous sources of large capital
funds-banks, insurance companies, investment funds, or private owners
of very large fortunes - and create a monopoly.38
Perhaps as good a reason as any for the persistence of the concern over
predatory pricing is that those who regard it as a major problem have never
felt called upon to attempt the exercise of preparing a concrete proposal
for taking over a particular industry via predatory pricing. In preparing such
a business plan, it would be necessary to keep in mind four or five points:
(a) As long as a firm's competitors can recover their variable costs, it
will pay them to continue in production rather than retire from
the market. To be effective, therefore, the firm's below-cost selling
will have to be below variable costs. The level of variable costs
blunders. A relevant case is that of predatory pricing. For many years it was
believed that large sellers would frequently sell below their cost in order to destroy
their competitors. This belief, sustained by victims' anecdotes much like those we
now read about in the fraud area, spurred enactment of section 2 of the original
Clayton Act and other statutes. In 1958, a scholarly study of the Standard Oil
Trust showed that, even before section 2 was enacted, the most notorious predator
of them all had not, in fact, employed predatory pricing; the study also supplied
reasons why, as a matter of economic theory, such pricing is rarely a rational
strategy for monopolizing. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil
(N.J.) Case, I J. Law & Econ. 137 (1958). This study has never been refuted, and
is widely accepted. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1339-52 (1965). And they are corroborated
by the extraordinary paucity of cases over the years in which predatory pricing
could plausibly be inferred. Predatory pricing is now regarded by most students
of antitrust as very largely a mythical beast. The belief in its reality was based
on the same kind of casual, anecdotal evidence now adduced, again without good
basis in theory, to create belief in the existence of a serious problem of consumer
fraud.
Id.
37 See Pertaining to the Robinson-Patman Act and the Federal Trade Commission,
Statement of Angus McDonald, Director of Research, National Farmers Union, presented
to the Subcomm. on Activities of Regulatory Agencies Relating to Small Business of the
House Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 2, 4, 7-9 (1969).
88 Cf. Conglomerate Merger Hearings at 20 n.1 (remarks of Dr. Willard F. Mueller).
Dr. Mueller recognizes that the single-market firm could make the "investment" decision.
He also suggests three reasons why a single-market firm might find the "investment" less
attractive than would a multi-market firm: (a) the possibility of short run negative total
profits; (b) inability to generate the needed funds internally (an assumption hard to
reconcile with the profitability of some single-line firms); and (c) inability to benefit from
the investment in other markets. No a priori basis is advanced for supposing that (a) and
(b) are less serious deterrents to division managers of multiple market firms than to
independent owners of single market firms, nor are any empirical examples given where
predation in one market has paid off in another market.
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differs widely from industry to industry, but for the benefit of those
unacquainted with industrial cost structures, the implied price cut
would typically run on the order of 30 to 60 percent and represent
a considerable multiple of profits.
(b) Whatever variable costs may be at the beginning of a price war,
they are likely to get lower as the battle progresses. The history of
cost reduction in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.8 9 is in-
structive, with profits surviving radically declining prices.
(c) It will be necessary to include plans for expanding the firm's pro-
duction facilities to the extent necessary to supply the entire mar-
ket. Otherwise, competitors can stay out of the market until the
firm's facilities are entirely loaded (at prices far below the firm's
full cost) and then return to the market at prices equal to their
variable costs or somewhat more, depending on the importance of
delivery schedules to customers in the market. In addition, the
firm's new production facilities will have to be adequate to supply
not only the volume sold at the old price, but also the expanded
volume which can be sold at or somewhat below variable costs, since
otherwise, competitors would have room to survive indefinitely in
this expanded market. In other words, the firm is in the position
of planning for construction of facilities considerably in excess of
anything it can expect to load at a price sufficient to recover full
costs.
(d) In preparing this plan for a skeptical appropriations committee, it
will be necessary to deal with the contingency that some of the
customers in the market, observing what is going on, may wish to
protect themselves from dependence on a single source of supply by
a defensive acquisition of one of your competitors (presumably, at
some point your competitors will be up for sale at a bargain price).
If, perchance, these defensive customers include such firms as Sears
or General Motors, the problem of protecting against this con-
tingency may not be soluble. More broadly, it will be necessary to
deal with the risk that some or all of the competitors will eventually
be acquired by others with resources equal to the firm's and who are
willing to stay with the industry until prices start going back up.
(e) Some estimate of the firm's prospective monopoly profits will be
required, i.e., the difference between the monopoly price and the
full costs of output at the monopoly level. Against this prospective
return, it will be necessary to weigh the cost of acquiring the
monopoly, measured by the losses incurred in selling below full
costs over a period likely to run several years and the cost of
constructing facilities considerably in excess of those required at
monopoly output levels. Potential monopoly profits are largely a
39 386 U.S. 685, rehearing denied, 387 U.S. 949 (1967).
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function of elasticity of demand in the particular market, subject
to the reservation that a program of drastic price increases will fre-
quently provoke customers to postpone purchases, to go into the
second-hand market, or to seek out substitutes which may not be
completely rational equivalents for the firm's product. In estimating
the time required to carry out the program, it may therefore be
necessary to plan for gradual price increases over a period of several
years to bring below-variable-cost prices up to monopoly levels.
As one might expect from the parameters implicit in such a plan, the
few decided cases where predatory pricing has been successfully claimed have
involved local, rather than national, markets, with most of the victims ap-
parently already on the ragged edge of failure.
40
Acquisition of a monopoly by predatory pricing would constitute an
exceptionally public violation of section 2; and in Sherman Act territory,
a study of the economic shortcomings of such a scheme is of interest pri-
marily as a preface to examination of a slightly less ambitious abuse of
pricing - namely, as a punishment for competitive price cutting. The
theory is that in an industry made up of small firms, entry by a large firm
chills the preexisting competitive ardor of the small firms and converts them
into timid followers of pricing policies administered by the large entrant.
4
'
This timidity is attributed to the small firms' inability to survive a price
war is long as the large firm could survive it. From the point of view of the
prosecuting authorities opposing a merger, this theory has the special attrac-
tion that a prima facie case can be made from the subjective testimony of
interested smaller competitors, who as witnesses can easily be presented as
40 The cases are collected in the opinion of the court of appeals in Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
41 See Mr. Justice Douglas' statement in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,
578 (1967):
The liquid bleach industry was already oligopolistic before the acquisition, and
price competition was certainly not as vigorous as it would have been if the
industry were competitive. Clorox enjoyed a dominant position nationally, and
its position approached monopoly proportions in certain areas. The existence of
some 200 fringe firms certainly does not belie that fact. Nor does the fact, relied
upon by the court below, that, after the merger, producers other than Clorox
"were selling more bleach for more money than ever before." In the same period,
Clorox increased its share from 48.8% to 52%. The interjection of Procter into
the market considerably changed the situation. There is every reason to assume
that the smaller firms would become more cautious in competing due to their
fear of retaliation by Procter. It is probable that Procter would become the price
leader and that oligopoly would become more rigid.
Id. (emphasis added and citations omitted). Cf. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d
223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962):
The power of the "deep pocket" or "rich parent" for one of the florist foil sup-
pliers in a competitive group where previously no company was ever large and
all were relatively small opened the possibility and power to sell at prices ap-
proximating cost or below and thus to undercut and ravage the less affluent
competition.
Apparently, the "predatory" pricing complained of was initiated by Reynolds' less-than-
intimidated competitors. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1313, 1343-44 (1965).
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properly canonized underdogs. If the acquiring firm has, in the name of
foothold sales promotion or otherwise, introduced some price reductions in
the industry, its competitive initiatives can be portrayed as improper and
anticompetitive.
Another facet of the entrenchment theory is its applicability to the ac-
quisition of a leading firm in a concentrated industry by a large multi-
product or conglomerate company. Here, the argument is that no other
potential challenger will risk entering an industry in which one of the
leaders has the financial capacity to wage a prolonged price war.42
In a market with enough sellers to provide the perfect competition of
theory, neither a small independent nor a similarly small division of a
large conglomerate would stand to gain by charging above or below the
going market price. The cross-subsidization-entrenchment argument pre-
supposes imperfect competition; and as applied to an independent who may
feel that his pricing discretion is affected by the conglomerate, the argument
is limited to independents with a large enough market share to force their
competitors to react to a price reduction, i.e., to single market oligopolists.
This naturally leads to the question of why a single line oligopolist
should wish to reduce its prices or to forego an opportunity to follow a
competitor's price rise. The conventional possibilities include: (a) disagree-
ment as to the price level which will generally maximize net revenue for
all sellers in the market; (b) the desire to increase market share; (c) the desire
to meet various forms of nonprice competition by others, or to check promo-
tional efforts of a newcomer to gain or increase its market share; (d) the
desire, by a spot price reduction, to obtain a particularly attractive order.
A price move in furtherance of any of these objectives carries risk of trig-
gering an excessive reaction by competitors, both independent and con-
glomerate; and the question is whether or not conglomerates are inherently
more likely to over-react than are other competitors.
The recent FTC Report argues in effect that the conglomerate is less
restrained in pricing in any one market because underpricing in one market
has less effect on its total earnings than on the total earnings of the single-
line companies in that market.43 What this argument disregards is the fact
that in the conglomerate it is the division manager who is held responsible
for pricing in his market. The effect on his division's results is as striking
as the effect on a single-line firm; and the procedures for dealing with a
division manager who prices himself into inadequate current profits are
both more certain of application and more summary than procedures for
disciplining similarly errant presidents of independent corporations.
As a generalization, there is little reason to believe that a prudent firm
will intentionally forego the best obtainable current price in the hope of
obtaining higher total profit margin at some later date. The future prices
42 FTC REPORT 402.
43 See, e.g., id. at 418-20.
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still dependent on the uncertainties of competitors' behavior -including
the possibility that they will come to the preferred price level as well without
as with a price war.
The FTC Report largely confirms the impression that punitive pricing
by conglomerates is not a significant feature of the American economy.
From its 55 years of clinical experience, the staff was able to cite only three
markets where the phenomenon had allegedly occurred:** (i) The Safeway
Case: Groceries in Texas and New Mexico in 1954-1955; (ii) The Kraft Case:
Jams and jellies in Washington-Maryland-Virginia in January-February
1961; and (iii) The Anheuser-Busch Case: Beer in St. Louis from October
1953 to March 1955.
In Anheuser-Busch the FTC Examiner found that there was no cross-
subsidization, and the Seventh Circuit concluded that the FTC failed to
prove any "present, actual injury to competition." 45
The most important question raised by all three examples is whether or
not the punitive strategy proved profitable, and the FTC Report does not
deal with this question. There are earnings figures in the Safeway case in-
dicating that Safeway's total profits improved considerably after it was forced
to discontinue loss selling.46 The Kraft case involved a "two cases for the
price of one" promotional offer to retail stores who took advantage of it by
buying their requirements for some weeks ahead. It is at least doubtful
that the promotion was profitable to Kraft. In the Anheuser-Busch case, the
opinion of the Seventh Circuit makes it quite clear that Anheuser-Busch
was following a pricing strategy designed more to recover lost market posi-
tion than to add to its profit margin.4 7 In short, the FTC Report is not re-
sponsive to the view that in a profit-maximizing economy, predatory or
punitive pricing will rarely occur, simply because in any normal circum-
stances it is unprofitable. The risk that multi-market firms will deliberately
engage in unprofitable behavior or slip into it by misjudgment is, on
normal economic assumptions, not of sufficient significance to suggest the
need of policy action.
B. Reciprocity
The economic critics of conglomerates have placed major emphasis on
reciprocity, that is, "the practice of taking your business to those who bring
their business to you." 48 While the opportunity, if not the propensity, for
44 Id. at 406-43.
45 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 838 (7th Cir. 1961): "The respondent
Anheuser-Busch, had embarked on its allegedly punitive pricing policy after losing (mostly
to competitors) some 35% of its sales value in one year." The FTC Report gives no
figures on Anheuser-Busch's sales losses preceding the price reductions.
46 FTC REPORT 420.
47 See 289 F.2d at 838-40.
48 FTC REPORT 323.
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reciprocity is said to be increased by participation in many markets, reciproc-
ity is not ordinarily a significant factor in the marketing of consumer goods,
since the consumer is not usually in the position of offering a service of his
own to his suppliers. Reciprocity is, however, a factor in industrial pur-
chasing, but exactly how significant a factor is difficult to determine.
Industrial purchasing is conducted with a view to resale at a profit,
and the pressure to buy at the best available price is obvious and direct.
The payment of a price premium to a vendor on the basis of reciprocity has
no business justification except as a form of price reduction on reciprocal
sales to the vendor. If, in other words, Trucking Company X pays a higher
price for General tires than X would have to pay some other tire manufac-
turer in order to get General to give Trucking Company X its freight busi-
ness, what the trucking company is in substance doing is allowing General
a concealed rebate on freight rates. 49 The usual rules of the reciprocity
game, as well as the profit motive, seem to require that reciprocity not be
considered as a factor in industrial purchasing unless all other factors are
equal (i.e., price, quality, and delivery).50 The distaste of many firms for
reciprocity arises precisely from the necessity of admitting that its com-
petitors really are equal to it in price, quality, and delivery. Such admissions
are more than distasteful; they present substantial problems of morale and
motivation within the business organization.
There are other reasons why reciprocity is not more widely favored in
the business community. The marketing executive is faced with the dilemma
that if his competitors are in an equally good position to use reciprocity,
engaging a trade relations director will increase expenses without increasing
sales; while if his competitors are not in a position to use reciprocity, the
danger arises that the competition will respond with an unwelcome price
reduction. 51 To the purchasing department, a reciprocity program reduces
the range of discretion open to it and is at best an extraneous burden on its
operations.
It is not altogether evident that effective elimination of reciprocity
would actually make it easier for new suppliers to break into a given market.
In the absence of reciprocity, it is conceivable that many corporate pur-
chasing departments would - as they do - limit themselves to one, two or
three suppliers as a matter of purchasing convenience. Thus, reciprocity
might cause a company selling supplies to a given industry to divide its
reciprocal purchases among more of its customers than it would otherwise
accept as vendors.
There is also reason to doubt that reciprocity necessarily operates to
the advantage of large or diversified companies. The game turns on the
balance of payments, and, as the FTC Report indicates, trading off pay-
49 Id. at 386.
50 Id. at 387: "'[lit's never equal.'"
51 This risk, of course, underlies part of the economic argument by Stigler and Coase
that reciprocity is procompetitive. See id. at 328 n.2.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ment balances can be practiced through a long chain or title: if Company
A has a trade surplus with Company B, Company B may offset this surplus
by its own trade surplus with Company C, which has a trade surplus with
Company A.52 Perhaps Leontieff tables offer a hint as to the ultimate solu-
tion of the reciprocity problem.
This unenthusiastic view of reciprocity as a profit making strategy finds
some slight support in the data from one of the more spectacular reciprocity
programs to find its way into the court - that conducted by General Dy-
namics after it acquired Liquid Carbonic in an effort to diversify from de-
fense to commercial business.5 3 The reciprocity program was accompanied
by a 3.3 percent reduction in sales between 1960 and 1962.54 The suspicion
that reciprocity is a form of business ineptitude is not lessened by the fact
that between 1957 and 1962, Liquid Carbonic's share of the total tons of
carbon dioxide shipped by the six leading producers increased from 33.6 to
36.1 percent, 55 particularly if one refers back to the district court opinion,
where the FTC Report sentence is completed with the words "and from
36.2 to 37.5 percent in dollar amounts."56 A 1.3 percent increase in dollar
share for a 2.5 percent increase in share of physical volume is a highly
ambiguous path to profit growth.
Reciprocity is, in the present state of the law, likely to amount to a
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and probably
also of section 1 of the Sherman Act.5 7 As a business tactic, it has little ap-
peal except in industries where competitors are prepared to admit that
each other's offerings are "equal." Curiously, the most striking reciprocity
cases go back to the 1930's and arise out of efforts to break legally regulated
monopoly prices (railroad and terminal rates) by setting up a vendor to the
railroads (in two cases) and a captive terminal company (in the third).58 It
is difficult to discern any persuasive basis for concluding that either the
effects of reciprocity are unambiguously evil or that the propensity to engage
in it is so strong that otherwise reasonable forms of business organization
must be suppressed in order to avoid reciprocity.
C. Potential Competition
The development of the multi-product firm evidently adds measurably
to the range of potential competition. The potential entrant is not con-
52 Id. at 378-80.
53 United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
54 See FTC REPORT 352.
55 Id. at 353.
56 258 F. Supp. at 51.
57 For a review of the case law, see The Antitrust Attack on Reciprocity and Reciproc-
ity Effects, Address by R. W. Donnem, Antitrust Law Section of the American Bar Ass'n,
Dallas, Tex., Aug. 12, 1969, in-5 CCH TR"E REG. REP. 50,259 (1969).
58 See id. at 55,549. Two shippers had set up vendors to the railroads, leading to
Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931) and Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932).
See also California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937) (the corporation set up its Own
terminal subsidiary).
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ceptually limited to firms whose engineering, manufacturing, or distribution
facilities are readily adapted to the market under consideration. The econ-
omy moves noticeably closer to the economic postulate of perfect mobility
of resources; if a given market offers an above-normal rate of profit on the
cost of entry, the venture company is not necessarily inhibited by the lack
of any present ties to that market. The lesson that diversification need not
be limited to neighboring markets, once taught by the new conglomerates,
is not lost on older multi-market firms. Also, the greater the diversity of
operations of a given firm, the greater the likelihood that it will already have
available some part of the experience and resources needed to enter any
given market.
One obvious effect of enlarging the number of potential entrants is to
reduce the likelihood that entry by acquisition on the part of any one poten-
tial entrant will perceptibly affect the competitive structure of the market.
But much more broadly, in any market (and hence in all markets) the entry
forestalling price and the competitive price can be expected to converge as
the number of firms including that market in their search for above-average
profit opportunities expands. 59 Theoretically, the buildup in potential com-
petition implicit in the growth of the free-ranging multi-product firm would
appear to have pro-competitive effects of a general scope and importance
completely offscale in relation to the rather finicky case made for the anti-
competitive effects of particular conglomerate mergers.
Part of the economic weakness of an inflexible anti-acquisition policy
is that such a policy furnishes established firms in any given market with
some degree of protection against entry by a newcomer inadequately sea-
soned in the folkway of the trade. The Neal Task Force Report suggests a
rule that outsiders should be permitted to enter a concentrated market by
acquiring one of the smaller firms in the market, but not by acquiring one
of the leading firms. 60 Here the hope seems to be that the acquiring company
will develop a smaller firm at the expense of the larger firms in the market,
with a resulting enhancement of competition.
There have been some instances where a new entrant has effected a
radical dislocation of a concentrated market by a plan of entry which in-
cluded some small acquisitions. The history of General Motors and the
locomotive business is perhaps the best known. One may, however, cherish a
certain skepticism as to whether the history of the locomotive industry would
have been any different if General Motors had proceeded by the acquisition
of American Locomotive, Baldwin, or Lima, instead of proceeding by a
foothold acquisition of a small diesel engine builder.
Finally, there is the argument that entry into a new market by internal
59 But cf. Sherman & Willett, Potential Entrants Discourage Entry, 75 J. POL. ECON.
400 (1967), where it is argued that since multiple potential entrants are a deterrent to
entry, the entry-forestalling price will be raised by increasing the number of potential
entrants.
60 NEAL TASK FoacE REPORT 5646.
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growth is, in some general sense, preferable to entry by acquisition. 6' In
terms of the economic employment of productive resources, it is difficult to
see why there is any public interest in adding plant capacity to a given in-
dustry unless existing capacity is inadequate. To require a newcomer to
bear the capital and operating losses of a new plant of minimum efficient
size until sales can be built up to the break-even point - at which revenue
offsets costs - will often amount to a major entry barrier. The construction
of excess plant ranks as one of the more certain ways of losing an invest-
ment, and the invitation is likely to be resisted by investors.
D. The Socio-political Criticisms
In most small or medium-size American communities, the news that a
prominent local business and civic leader has sold out his firm is not partic-
ularly welcome; and the professional manager sent in by the "outside"
buyer to replace the local owner is not necessarily an adequate substitute
in the civic structure of the local community. Fortunately or not, the popula-
tion of the United States is geographically and socially mobile, and on bal-
ance, it is almost certainly a good thing that a man making a career in
general management has a national (or international) market for his capabil-
ities. This is not to say that American mobility is without its social problems,
but only to suggest that the problems of mobility are easier to bear than the
problems of immobility.
The argument that conglomerates represent a political power threat
is even more difficult to take seriously. A large concentration of wealth un-
doubtedly has a substantial political capability if it can lawfully be applied
to political purposes, as illustrated by the successful political use of the
Rockefeller and Kennedy fortunes. The fatal problem with similar political
use of corporate concentrations of wealth is that they cannot lawfully be
applied to political uses, 62 even if stockholders could be induced to agree on
common political objectives and the business organization could survive the
necessary diversion of effort. Salaried corporate managers are probably not
as rich a potential source of political contributions as oil lessors, owners of
automobile dealerships, and other entrepreneurs with substantial personal
fortunes. And corporate management is rarely able to deliver the votes even
of corporate stockholders, let alone employees, dealers, or suppliers. The
Automobile Dealers Day-in-Court Act 63 is eloquent testimony to the com-
parative political power of some very large corporations on the one hand
and a group of "small" businessmen on the other. And in the judicial branch
of government, the track record of large corporations before the Supreme
Court suggests either a total lack of corporate political influence on the ap-
pointment of justices or an exceptional lack of corporate acumen in picking
friends.
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THE CONGLOMERATES
It would be closer to the truth to say that the large publicly held cor-
poration, as an institution, has seldom received due credit for the socio-
political contributions it has made to democracy of opportunity. Widespread
nepotism has not been one of the faults of the publicly held company; and
it has, within the limits of human fallibility, been generally faithful to the
principle of merit advancement. There is much to be said for the family-
held enterprise; but as soon as one gets beyond surface comparisons of size,
it turns out that the case for the family firm inevitably lies far more in an
aristocratic, "family in the house on the hill" tradition than in a democratic
tradition.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of business organization, there are a number of recognizable
and potentially valuable functions for the headquarters level of manage-
ment in conglomerate firms. Whether they will realize their potential can-
not be known without some years of experiment. The outcome may ver
well be indecisive, with some firms successful and others more or less un
successful. But there is little reason to think that partial or complete failure
of the experiment will entail important costs in terms of consumer welfare,
though the cost to investors - whose role is to take such risks - may be
considerable. The more likely consequence is a considerable increase in the
force of potential competition and in mobility of resources. And success of
the experiment could contribute substantially to the dynamics of the econ-
omy and to both consumer and investor welfare.
The case for cutting off the experiment is particularly weak if one views
a free economy as, among other things, a laboratory for the development and
testing of new forms of organization. There is reason to believe that orga-
nization differences - embracing broadly motivation, leadership, and infor-
mation flow - are responsible for far greater differences in economic
productivity than are the competitive differences and inefficiencies of re-
source allocation explored in classical economic analysis.6 4 Substantial con-
tributions to consumer welfare resulted from the invention of such economic
institutions as the mail order house; the department store; the chain store;
branch banking; various forms of franchised stores, restaurants, motels, and
manufacturers; supermarkets; and, arguably, the multi-line corporation. All
were attacked in one way or another by interests opposed to any reduction
in the number of business firms -interests which some may think have
prophesied disaster at least once too often.
64 See Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency", 56 AM. ECON. REv. 392
(1966). For subsequent comments, see McNulty & Shelton, Comments on Allocative Effi-
ciency vs. "X-Efficiency", 57 Am. EcoN. REv. 1249, 1252 (1967); Wenders, Entry and
Monopoly Pricing, 75 J. POL. ECON. 755 (1967).
